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ABSTRACT 
 
RADICAL ENHANCEMENT AS A MORAL STATUS DE-ENHANCER 
 
 Human enhancement has worried many thinkers. Some have focused on the potential 
harms that may befall us, should we walk the path of enhancement. One such harm may be that 
enhancements serve to undermine our unique human dignity. I argue that the concept of human 
dignity is better replaced by that of moral status. Others have worried that radical 
enhancements—those enhancements that give us abilities greatly outside our species typical 
functioning will lead to a new moral status. I argue that the sorts of enhancements we are likely 
to seek, namely direct mental state control, will give us reason to think the enhanced will have a 
moral status subordinate to our own. Finally, I argue that despite the radically enhanced not 
existing, we still have obligations to create them. I call this the competing known identity 
problem. Assuming some persons will exist in the future, we have reasons to create the best 
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 The prospects for human enhancement become greater with each day that passes.  
Many are excited about the bountiful possibilities that await us. Our capacities and abilities may 
be augmented in ways that improve our quality of life. We may one day shape our psychology to 
make us more compassionate and caring, improving the quality of life for those around us. The 
path to enhancement will be risky, and many of the blunders of the past should be avoided. The 
power to enhance should lie with individuals as opposed to a central organization like the state, 
removing the concerns about eugenics programs of the past (Savulescu, 2001). Rigorous testing 
and safety protocols can protect and increase the well-being of those who choose to enhance. 
Enhancement will proceed slowly, but as we master our biology we will become better and better 
at manipulating it, in just the same way we manipulate other technology around us. By definition 
enhancements are a good thing (Harris, 2007, p. 36), and should be welcomed by all. 
 Many have failed to share my optimism. It is often argued that enhancements are 
malignant in nature. Some opponents argue that enhancements will erode our dignity and strip us 
of our moral status and special place in the world. I explore this in chapter one and argue that the 
concept of dignity should be abandoned. If we abandon dignity, then we will need to replace it 
with a new concept. Moral status can do all the work of dignity, but without any of the baggage.  
 A second criticism has been voiced by Nicholas Agar who argues that radically enhanced 
beings will have a superior moral status than mere humans. In chapter two I give a plausible 
conception of what radically enhanced beings will be like. I agree with Agar that there could be a 
change to moral status, but I diverge as I argue the radically enhanced will experience a 
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reduction in moral status. Since the radically enhanced will be better than us along many, if not 
all dimensions, it is hard to imagine how this could be. I argue that if we view moral status in 
terms of vulnerability, it is inevitable that the enhanced will occupy a lower moral status 
threshold than us. 
 Agar has also argued that since there are risks to us with enhancing, and since we have no 
obligation to enhance, we should only do those enhancements that are safe and within a species-
typical range. In chapter three I introduce the competing known identity problem. I argue that we 
can garner valuable insights into who we ought to be from coexisting and highly similar versions 
of ourselves. This is then extrapolated to cases where we become radically enhanced, as if it is 
another normal stage of development. Since it is likely many members will wish to preserve a 














Chapter 1: Dignity & Moral Status 
 Concepts like dignity are often hard to put into words. This lack of clarity has stopped 
few from using it as an analytic tool to distinguish humans from the rest of the animal world. 
This chapter will focus on three views of dignity. The strongest views are held by 
bioconservatives and the weakest endorsed by transhumanists. The weakest version is offered by 
Nick Bostrom who argues for dignity as inclusivity. The middle ground position is put forward 
by Francis Fukuyama who argues for our uniqueness as a species in a secular light. The strongest 
views are religious in nature and highly exclusive. Leon Kass advances a view of dignity that 
stems from God. In what follows I will explore these three views in greater detail. It is precisely 
because of dignity’s ancestral baggage that the concept is so muddled and I will argue that 
attempts to salvage it have failed. Moral status is a far superior concept as it captures what we 
really care about—respect and fair treatment for all and does so with far fewer complications.  
1.1 Bostrom & Dignity 
 Nick Bostrom argues that the concept of human dignity is extendable to posthumans (the 
radically enhanced). Bioconservatives will deny this compatibilist view, as they view dignity as a 
unique property among humans that either confers moral status or imbues a sense of worth on us 
and separates us from the non-human animals. Two fears predominate among bioconservatives. 
The first fear is that the transhumanist project will degrade our sense of worth, resulting in a 
reduction of dignity. The second fear is that posthumans, through their superior capabilities, will 
pose a violent threat to ordinary human beings (Bostrom, 2005, 204-209). Bostrom distinguishes 
between two notions of dignity that are commonly used in the literature. 
1. (R) Dignity as moral status, in particular the inalienable right to be treated with a 
basic level of respect. 
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2. (W) Dignity as the quality of being worthy or honorable; worthiness, worth, 
nobleness, excellence ((p. 209) my additions to his formulation are (R) and (w)). 
Some version of (R) and (W) are present in most discussions of dignity. These will be further 
modified in sections 1.2 and 1.3, where I discuss bioconservative views. Bostrom’s own version 
of Dignity is something closer to (R), “Transhumanists, by contrast, see human and posthuman 
dignity as compatible and complementary. They insist that dignity in its modern sense, consist in 
what we are, and we have the potential to become, not in our pedigree or our causal origin” 
(Bostrom, 2005, p. 213).  
 Bostrom supports his compatibilist view with the observation that we are enhanced in 
many respects when compared to our ancestors. We have expanded our intellectual toolkit with 
the ability to read and write. We have greatly expanded our lifespans and regularly bend 
technology to our will. We are far more efficient in every domain of life than our predecessors. 
The numerous cultural and technological enhancements we have endowed ourselves with may 
make us unrecognizable to our past selves. Despite the enhancements we have developed so far, 
we still feel a sense of pride, self-worth and an unshakeable feeling that we have moral worth. 
This shows the compatibility of (R) and (W). Bioconservative will agree with the analysis thus 
far. Bostrom will diverge from more traditional views as he views dignity as a dynamic, 
morphable property, rather than the static and rigid property of his opponents. Dignity in this 
sense can be thought of as basic dignity, and I will describe it in terms of both (R) and (W). 
(RW): Dignity as inclusivity. Moral status and self-worth are conserved despite massive 
permutations to existing human attributes. This conversation is extended even in the event of 
unique and novel attributes. 
 I suspect many will be sympathetic to (RW), but I worry that (RW) is too encompassing a 
concept for bioconservatives to engage with. One problem is that the concept of dignity has 
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traditionally been used to separate us from the non-human animals, and more contemporarily to 
distance us from the advancements in A.I. Dignity has often been used to signify our uniqueness 
amongst other terrestrial life. If dignity is to be identified with inclusivity, it radically alters the 
concept from what those that have traditionally meant by it. Instead of modifying the concept, it 
is far easier to use a different concept to talk about the same thing. What we are all concerned 
with here is moral status.  
My main objection to (RW) has little to do with whether bioconservatives will endorse it 
or not, but rather, with its inability to offer any guidance on when or how we as a species could 
lose dignity. Presumably, decreasing our capacities will do little to diminish our dignity. There 
already exists a great distribution in our natural talents and capacities, and it seems hardly fitting 
to suggest that those with congenital disabilities lack dignity. But many non-human animals have 
more cognitive capacities and a greater degree of self-reliance than the severely impaired, and 
the concept of dignity seems unfitting for them. Moral status is a far better fit. A full discussion 
of moral status will be undertaken in chapter 2. For now we can think of moral status as the thing 
that affords us certain rights, privileges and beneficial treatment. 
Moving in the opposite direction, it is difficult to imagine how enhancements could move 
one outside the bounds of (RW), as (RW) offers no guidance on how this could happen. As 
Bostrom prefers that enhancements are pursued by individuals, rather than mandated by the state, 
it seems reasonable that some individuals would opt to increase some capacities like intelligence, 
and diverge from the more traditional aspects of humanity that comprise our social and inner 
lives. These persons may be extreme logic machines completely divorced from humanity. They 
will certainly have moral worth and status, but, taken to enough of an extreme, dignity may be an 
unfitting concept. If dignity is a concept worth holding onto, it must have some boundaries, even 
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if they are fuzzy. Bostrom’s account is boundless. If everything has dignity, then the concept 
becomes meaningless. Two conceptions of dignity offered by Kass and Fukuyama have very 
clear boundaries. In the next two sections I will argue these accounts are too exclusive to be 
taken seriously.  
1.2 Fukuyama & Dignity 
In Our Posthuman Future Francis Fukuyama worries about the conflict that will emerge 
between the enhanced and unenhanced. This conflict is political in nature and will likely result in 
war between the two distinct classes of people. Dignity is the very thing that grounds our 
political rights and ensures fair treatment. (Fukuyama, 2002, Ch. 8).  
 According to Fukuyama, we are in a constant battle with one another for recognition and 
respect. Recognition and respect have been denied to many people over time based on arbitrary 
criteria. As we are all human, Fukuyama searches for a property common amongst us all. 
Fukuyama calls this Factor X and it is what grounds dignity. 
 Our species-typical traits have remained largely the same over the past 100,000 years. 
Some traits, such as race, sex and hair color, are relatively unimportant as a basic component of 
dignity. Factor X has to be a non-arbitrary feature, something we all share, a feature that is the 
essence of a human being. We are unique non-reducible creatures, and this uniqueness is 
Fukuyama’s target for grounding dignity. This uniqueness comes in the form of (1) a unique 
human politics, where we cooperate and engage with one another in ways entirely distinct from 
the rest of the animal kingdom and (2) a unique form of consciousness which constitutes our rich 
inner lives. Of course we have a unique ability to reason, but Fukuyama sees a similar capacity 
being developed in computing, and these objects lack dignity (Fukuyama, 2002, p. 162-171). 
What is needed is something more unique and complex. We have a full range of human emotions 
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that separate us from the rest of life. It is our human emotions that give rise to our fears, goals, 
desires and is the source of our values. As such, these are the most important contributors to 
dignity and are what compromise Factor X. 
 As we have seen, Factor X is a human’s propensity for politics, and our consciousness 
that gives rise to a full range of emotions. These capacities have evolved and are tied to our 
genetic history. Modifying our genome through human enhancement poses a direct threat to 
dignity and we risk losing our special status and political rights. 
Fukuyama worries enhancement will diminish our inner lives to advance utilitarian goals.  
Utilitarians aim to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Pruning our emotional capacities is an 
effective way to do this. Ritalin has this effect and the added benefit of making children more 
tractable and other enhancements are likely to follow suit.  
 What separates Fukuyama from Bostrom is his reliance on the uniqueness of humans as 
the ground to dignity. Bostrom will have no problem extending dignity to non-human animals, or 
even intelligent machines, but Fukuyama thinks extending the concept of dignity outside of 
humans will lower our status. Fukuyama is skeptical of artificial intelligence reaching human 
levels of cognition but, in the event it does, he finds this prospect damning. “If they are right, this 
will have important consequences for our notions of human dignity, because it will have 
conclusively proven that human beings are essentially nothing more than complicated machines 
that can be made out of silicon and transistors as easily as carbon and neurons1” (Fukuyama, 
 
1 As Fukuyama gives a secular account of dignity this is an odd statement to make. I worry that 
many attempts to secularize dignity are religious in nature. There is much overlap between 
Fukuyama’s and Kass’s account. This is reminiscent of the intelligent design movement. Many 
advocates attempt to give a “scientific” account that makes no mention of a specific God, but 
they generally hold a Christian worldview. For example, the works of Michael Behe and Stephen 
Meyer highlight this well..  
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2002, p.168). To clarify Fukuyama’s position we can modify (R) from Bostrom and add the 
uniqueness component to it. 
(RU): Dignity as moral status: Humans are endowed with unique capacities and traits which, 
when taken as a whole, comprise dignity. Alterations to these natural capacities pose a threat 
to dignity or moral status. 
 (RU) is far more exclusive than Bostrom’s own account. (RU) better matches our 
intuitions, as it allows us to recognize our uniqueness in the world. But it has several drawbacks. 
First, it is not necessary to stunt our inner lives when seeking out enhancements. Enhancements 
can move in both directions and it is readily imaginable that many people will augment their 
emotional and creative abilities. It remains unclear why human enhancements that increase 
complexity will not confer additional or even new forms of dignity. Fukuyama seems to be 
exhibiting the status quo bias. To test if we are unduly and irrationally preferring what is, rather 
than what could be, Bostrom has given us the reversal test. 
Reversal Test: When a proposal to change a certain parameter is thought to have bad overall 
consequences, consider a change in the opposite direction. If this is also thought to have bad 
overall consequences, then the onus is on those who reach the conclusions to explain why our 
position cannot be improved through this parameter. If they are unable to do this, we have 
reason to suspect that they suffer from status quo bias (Bostrom, 2006, p. 664-65). 
Fukuyama seems to think we have reached a local optima. But this seems unlikely, as it is 
possible to make humans more complex, compassionate and caring. 
Second, it seems that some human beings fall largely outside the norms of engaging in 
politics and possessing a rich inner emotional life. For example, autism is a disorder 
characterized by a focus on systematizing and the inability to empathize (Baron-Cohen, 2012). 
The inner life of an individual with autism is radically different from our own; they have 
difficulty forming relationships and seem ill suited for the sort of public engagements that 
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constitute our politics. It is unclear why this would make a difference to dignity, given that 
individuals with autism have many of the attributes we deeply care about. They still from 
relationships, have wants, needs, desires and goals. They are still persons, and personhood seems 
to be much more important than the constitution of our genome.  
Factor X is a poor choice for dignity as it is too exclusive. The very traits that Fukuyama 
cites to establish dignity can be augmented. This should maintain dignity if it is a threshold 
concept or increase it if dignity is viewed in a scalar light. Since this does not happen Fukuyama 
may be exhibiting the status quo bias. Further, this view is troubling as it has the potential to 
exclude many members of the present population. Those that fall far below species-typical 
functioning can be excluded from having the coveted dignity, unless Fukuyama wants to start 
drawing arbitrary lines. If this is the case, then Fukuyama needs new criteria for Factor X. 
Dignity makes much more sense when it is left as a fuzzy concept. We know it when we see it, 
but it becomes readily apparent the problem with the concept when we attempt to get clear on 
what exactly it is. Next, a religious conception of dignity will be explored. 
1.3 Kass & Dignity 
The strongest conceptions of dignity are religious2 in nature. Leon Kass is a bio-
conservative who, like Fukuyama, has served on the president’s council of bioethics. Kass has 
argued for the importance of human dignity which has had profound consequences on our social 
policy. For Kass, two main elements comprise human dignity. The first is a basic human dignity, 
which sets a base threshold for how we ought to treat one another. The second is full human 
 
2 It will become apparent throughout this work that I have few sympathies for religion. 
Monotheistic religions are particularly unfriendly to human enhancement in as much as they 
teach human beings are the center of the universe. However, not all religions are equal. For those 
religions that don’t view humans at the top of the great chain of being, I hope you find this 
interesting, engaging and plausible.  
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dignity, which manifests when we actualize our full potential, show our excellence and display 
our true human nature. 
 Basic human dignity sets a minimum threshold for how we treat one another. All humans 
have a basic set of human worth. One reason for wanting this is largely practical and political. It 
would be unsettling if our organs could be used for the benefit of others, or if we could be 
enslaved and used as tools for the benefit of others (Kass, 2017, p. 170).  
This is certainly an ideal to strive for, but it says nothing about the great differences between 
humans across our society and why the non-human animals, who exhibit many of our coveted 
capacities, lack entrance into a base level of dignity. Kass grounds our dignity in our distinct 
humanness. Distinctively human traits include thought, freedom, moral choice, acts of kindness 
and love and friendship. These traits come from our God-given capacities; to realize our full 
human dignity we need to actualize these traits and maximize their potential. While this ensures 
that all human beings are endowed with dignity, it does not guarantee that we all possess the 
same level of dignity. 
 Kass often illustrates dignity through everyday examples and even short vignettes, 
making it a more abstract than principled concept. Dignity is the sort of thing we feel and 
experience, rather than analytically describe. It is as if we are equipped with inborn dignity 
detectors. For instance, consider former slaves, who reclaimed their dignity upon earning their 
freedom and fighting in the Union army during the Civil War. Or we can perceive the loss of 
dignity in the dutiful husband, whose wife treats him as an object of ridicule, and even goes as 
far as to make him a cuckold (Kass, 2017, p. 164-65). As a cuckold, his dignity is stripped from 
him. These examples are relatively uncontroversial, and readily capture what is meant by the use 
of the concept of dignity.  
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 Identifying worthiness is at the heart of the preceding examples. Our full human dignity, 
our full worth, is exemplified in those that exhibit the virtues of courage, compassion, generosity 
and righteousness. These may be exhibited in the most outstanding moral characters of our time 
but can also be found in the everyday ordinary acts of human beings, such as preparing a meal, 
washing a baby, or even helping out in the community. Like Fukuyama, Kass appreciates our 
voluminous emotional range: “No account of the dignity of being human is worth its salt without 
them” (Kass, 2017, p. 169).  
 So far, Kass has given us two components to dignity, that of full human dignity, and that 
of basic human dignity. This account adds little to Fukuyama’s apart from the grounding, where 
Kass turns to God. Humans have a dual nature, that of a higher dignity (being human) and lower 
dignity (human being). Our higher dignity is exemplified in the characteristics of our mind and 
our lower dignity in the passions of the body. We are dependent on the gift of our bodies from 
God to sustain life. Our bodies command our own respect and respect from those around us. We 
were created in His image, which includes our hearts and minds. Exercising the heart and mind 
allows us to exhibit our true human nature, the God-like qualities inherent in us all. This brings 
Kass to his critical conclusion “the inviolability of human life rests absolutely on the higher 
dignity—the godlikeness—of human beings” (Kass, 2017, p. 175). 
 This version of dignity calls for a new principle. In line with Fukuyama and Bostrom, 
Kass is concerned with respect and, like Fukuyama, Kass is also concerned with the uniqueness 
or specialness of our standing. He diverges from other views in how unique we are and the 
source of moral worth. This new conception is Respect-Uniqueness-Worthiness-God (RUWG) 
and states:  
(RUWG):  Dignity as moral status and worthiness. Dignity is constituted by our uniqueness 
in form and capacity, by our complexity, and by our god-like natures.  
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Like Fukuyama, Kass is worried about our uniqueness being undermined. Not only does 
he worry about radical changes, like genetic engineering, but he views technology as a threat to 
what it means to be human: “It seems dehumanizing to be reducing yourself to 29 scientifically 
tested, match-relevant ‘dimensions’” (Kass, 2017, p. 65).This is in reference to the online dating 
website eHarmony. But this seems to diverge from the most central elements of dignity and show 
that this is a love for the old ways, for a more conservative time, rather than a deep insight into 
the nature of dignity. 
This becomes even more apparent when we start to compile several of his views together. 
Much of his views focus on our sexual relationships. Courtship and the defense of a woman’s 
Honor are especially important (p. 48), morality is contained in our sexuality and that “safe sex is 
the self-delusion of the soul” (p. 57). Men are largely boorish creatures that rely on women to 
teach them morals through use of their sexual power (p. 61), and women best exercise their 
virtues when they are sexually modest (p.65). Kass’s view is problematic in that it is unlikely to 
resonate well in a secular crowd. It will run into further problems amongst those of differing 
religions and even amongst the various Christian denominations. Some denominations relegate 
women to more traditional roles. Why not view dignity in these terms, instead of just sexual 
modesty? Kass’s views on eHarmony and the role sexuality should play in our lives feels more 
like strongly held personal convictions, as opposed to deep insights into the metaphysical nature 
of reality. 
1.4 Concluding Remarks 
I have shown that dignity as a concept is too problematic to endorse. Weak versions, as 
put forward by Bostrom, are too inclusive to capture what is traditionally meant by dignity and 
unlikely to persuade anyone who uses it as a guide to morality. Moderate versions, as put 
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forward by Fukuyama, are too exclusive. His view focuses too narrowly on our genetic makeup 
and exhibits features of the status quo bias. It is readily imaginable that we could increase our 
emotional capacities and become more complex beings. As our emotions and complexity are 
what separate us from nonhuman animals, increasing these capacities should be a boon to our 
dignity and not a burden. The religious nature of Kass’s conception is unlikely to gain traction 
within many Christian circles and doomed to failure outside of Christian circles. His account 
undermines our autonomy and limits our use of tools like dating sites that can greatly improve 
our lives.  
In the next chapter, I will shift the focus from dignity to moral status. I will argue that we 
should view moral status in terms of vulnerability. Before I do this, I explore the views of several 
thinkers who argue that radically enhanced beings will have a greater moral status than us. I then 
give a plausible conception of the enhanced and argue that they will experience a reduction in 












Chapter 2: Radical Enhancement 
Radical enhancement—those enhancements that bring our capacities and abilities greatly 
outside species-typical functioning--have worried many. Nicholas Agar has argued that radically 
enhanced beings will have a moral status that exceeds our own (2014). Jeff McMahan has voiced 
a similar concern, focusing on our violability (2009), while Allen Buchanan (2009) worries the 
radically enhanced will have stronger interests than mere persons. I will argue that these 
concerns are misguided, as these novel beings will have a moral status subordinate to our own.  
 This chapter is broken into six sections. The first section will be spent clarifying the 
views of Agar, McMahan and Buchanan. In section two, I will motivate a plausible conception 
of the radically enhanced. Section three will be spent testing the conceptions of moral status 
offered by Agar, McMahan and Buchanan against my own conception—moral status as 
vulnerability. Section four will be spent arguing that cognitive enhancements are a morally 
desirable thing. In section five, I will argue for a narrow conception of vulnerability and its 
theoretical relation to moral status. The final section is reserved for objections. 
 2.1 Enhancement & Moral Status  
 Our abilities can be enhanced along many dimensions. Enhancing our physical abilities 
may include strength, stamina and vision, all of which are important for athletics and in daily 
life. We can mitigate muscle tremors, enhancing our ability to create art and perform surgery. 
We can even enhance our emotional and cognitive capacities, those things that constitute our 
inner life. These cognitive and emotional enhancements may take the form of intelligence and 
memory, or those elements that make our inner life worth having, including love, joy and 
empathy to name a few. It may be possible to enhance moral behavior; these moral disposition 
enhancements can make more moral behavior more likely (Douglas, 2008). We may even 
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enhance moral status directly. Moral status enhancement may arise from developing a new 
capacity, or perhaps augmenting capacities such as rationality and empathy may be sufficient to 
raise moral status. A variety of methods can be employed to make these enhancements a reality. 
Biochemical interventions, such as performance-enhancing drugs, are one option. Genetic 
interventions are becoming much more likely with the targeted approach of Crispr Cas9. 
Environmental enhancements are all familiar, including legal and educational institutions, as 
well as societal norms. While the radically enhanced will most likely be enhanced along every 
dimension mentioned and utilize several methods, the most pertinent to this discussion are those 
enhancements that constitute our inner life. In section two I will focus most closely on cognitive 
and moral (disposition and status) enhancement. But first, I want to get clear on several views of 
moral status. 
Nicholas Agar takes no issue with the enhancements mentioned above, as long as they 
are moderate enhancements—those enhancements that strengthen our capacities and abilities 
within species-typical functioning. Agar is concerned that enhancing outside the species-typical 
range will create post-persons—beings with greater moral status than mere persons (Agar, 2014, 
p. 157). If this is right, then it seems we mere persons may lose many of the rights and privileges 
we have grown accustomed to. The radically enhanced may edge us out of cooperating in civil 
society, they may act paternalistically toward us, undermining our autonomy, or they may even 
use us as model organisms in research, in much the same way we abuse a variety of non-human 
animals.  
 Agar focuses on direct moral status enhancements. Enhancing non-human animals with 
capacities sufficient for personhood would be one way to directly enhance moral status. The 
moral difference between persons and non-human animals often lies in their differential 
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treatment. For Agar, a moral status enhancer “increases a being’s entitlement to certain forms of 
beneficial treatment and reduces it’s eligibility for certain types of harmful treatment” (Agar, 
2014, p. 158-159). So moral status is: 
(MS): A being’s entitlement to certain forms of beneficial treatment and reduced eligibility 
for certain forms of harmful treatment.  
This is an intuitive notion of moral status, but it remains unclear why we should think post-
persons could experience the sort of moral status boost that non-human animals have the 
potential to experience, albeit through radical enhancement.  
Two key elements of Agar’s argument are: (1) a distinction between weak and strong 
thresholds, and (2) an induction from everyday observation. Strong thresholds for moral status 
are insensitive to the modification or addition of capacities. There will be no difference between 
persons and post-persons no matter the degree or type of enhancement. Weak thresholds are far 
more sensitive. Post-persons, given significant enough changes, will have some feature(s) that 
will make a positive difference to moral status (Agar, 2014, p. 162). Agar favors weak 
thresholds, but only speaks minimally in support of them. To aid his account I will turn to the 
work of Stan Husi. Husi argues against strong thresholds (and moral equality amongst mere 
persons3). One issue lies in our ability to transform scalar properties into binary ones. For 
example, rationality is clearly a scalar property that admits of degrees. We can be more and less 
rational within the species-typical range and there are a multitude of ways to increase or decrease 
rationality outside the species-typical range. Figuring out what category, or threshold, one is in 
 
3 Husi’s issue is with the conceptual framework of egalitarian principles, primarily threshold 
accounts. He is very clear that prejudices of the past and present are deplorable. Even though he 
finds threshold accounts unjustifiable, this in no way undermines our obligations to treat others 
with full respect.  
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just becomes a matter of math. Strong thresholds impose an asymmetry on the math that Husi 
finds implausible. Take any property relevant to moral status X, (X - n) makes a huge difference 
to moral status, removing one from a higher threshold. But adding to the relevant property X, (X 
+ n) makes no difference. Compelling reasons are needed to justify this asymmetry and Husi 
finds the asymmetry too implausible to be taken seriously (Husi, 2017, p. 391-92). Weak 
thresholds offer a plausible alternative to the more commonplace strong threshold view.  
Agar’s second move is to note the well-established gradient of moral concern that already 
exists. Rocks are sacrificed before non-human animals, and non-human animals are sacrificed 
before persons. Continuing the pattern would suggest that mere persons are sacrificed before 
post-persons. One thing to note is that it would be a very convenient fact that persons occupy the 
highest moral status category or tier. Agar’s point is much stronger: He argues that if moral 
statuses higher than personhood exist, and we are confronted with these beings directly, we will 
be unable to understand and recognize why they have greater status (Agar, 2014, p. 174, 78-80). 
The reason we do not continue the inductive move is a limitation of our creative and intellectual 
powers, rather than a feature of the world. These two points do not establish that higher statuses 
than personhood exist, but they provide enough justification to take the idea seriously. 
A second view on moral status comes from Jeff McMahan who also finds it plausible that 
higher statuses than personhood may exist. For McMahan, supra-persons4 may enter this 
uncharted territory. Supra-persons are beings whose psychological capacities exceed our 
capacities, by more than our psychological capacities exceed those of non-human animals 
(McMahan, 2009, p. 600). As increasing our psychological capacities alone might not be enough 
 
4 Post-persons, supra-persons and the radically enhanced are synonymous. I will use them 
interchangeably for stylistic reasons. I hope the reader won’t find this terribly confusing. 
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to alter moral status, McMahan offers the possibility that a new emergent property may grant 
access to a higher moral status threshold. The difference between the thresholds for mere and 
post-persons is the degree to which each is inviolable. In normal circumstances, no human being 
can be sacrificed for the benefit of another human being. But when the numbers are large 
enough, it becomes permissible to sacrifice one innocent person to save the lives of the many. 
Inviolability is not equal across all beings as non-human animals have a lower degree of 
inviolability, as they are readily sacrificed for food, clothing and research (McMahan, 2009, p. 
599-601). This second conception of moral status is: moral status as inviolability or (MSI). MSI 
states: 
MSI: The degree to which one human being can be sacrificed for the benefit of another 
human being. 
If this is right, then a single supra-person can only be sacrificed in the event that their life will 
save the lives of numerous mere persons. Conversely, several mere persons could be sacrificed 
for the benefit of a single supra-person. I challenge this in section III and argue that supra-
persons could be sacrificed before mere persons, despite the numbers. 
In contrast to Agar and McMahan, Allen Buchanan is highly skeptical of higher moral 
statuses. One reason is no positive account of the radically enhanced has been given. Without an 
idea of what enhancements will provide for greater moral status, the concern of beings with 
greater moral status can be put on hold (Buchanan, 2009, p. 354). A deeper reason is what 
Buchanan calls the Moral Equality Assumption (MEA). MEA holds that all beings who possess 
sufficient attributes for personhood have the same moral status (Buchanan, 2009, p. 347). 
Buchanan favors a strong threshold account, grounded in Kantian respect and the capacity for 
mutual accountability. For Buchanan, strong thresholds and the MEA better match our intuitions 
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about why beings with certain capacities deserve equal respect, and why increasing those 
capacities does not alter this base level of respect. This is contrasted with an interest-based view, 
which he attributes to utilitarians. Buchanan sees interest-based views as discarding moral status 
thresholds altogether and puts interests along a single continuum. For Buchanan, the problem 
with this view is that it is easy to classify different interests along a spectrum, but it is hard to 
draw a sharp line between interests. For example, it becomes difficult to draw a sharp line 
between humans and non-human animals (Buchanan, 2009, p. 360-61). As we intuitively draw 
this line, we should prefer strong thresholds over interest-based accounts. Further, if we treat all 
properties as if they were scalar properties, we might note the great variation in capacities and 
talents that already exist. It may be tempting to lower or raise the status of some humans and, 
given our history, that may be too much to accept. Unlike Agar and McMahan, Buchanan favors 
a strong threshold, but he still argues that the radically enhanced will take priority over their 
ordinary human counterparts. 
Buchanan’s chief concern is not about greater moral status (since there is unlikely to be 
higher ones), it is about what happens if competing interests emerge, ones that confer different 
rights on the enhanced and unenhanced. Post-persons may become enhanced cooperators, 
engaging in civic life in ways mere persons are unsuited for. Post-persons may act 
paternalistically toward us in the same way we act paternalistically towards the severely disabled 
(with the intent of protecting them), or they may exclude mere persons as they lack the capacity 
to cooperate in a meaningful way (Buchanan, 2009, p. 373-75). Buchanan uses the analogy of a 
card game. It is permissible to minimize participation between Go Fish players (mere persons) 
and Bridge players (post-persons) since Go Fish players cannot cooperate, interact with, or make 
a meaningful contribution to the game of Bridge. The interests of the Bridge players supersede 
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that of Go Fish players. These conflicting interests may be so great that the radically enhanced 
enjoy a richer set of rights, guaranteeing that their interests take priority, while the unenhanced 
enjoy a simpler basic set of rights. As moral status is the same, a third concern is that of 
conflicting interests or (CI). 
(CI): All agents share an equal moral status, but not equal interests. The enhanced will have a 
stronger claim (or right) to have their interests fulfilled. 
 Three views of moral status have just been offered. Before I introduce and motivate my 
own conception of moral status I will address two pressing items. First, we need a conception of 
what the radically enhanced will be like. In the next section, I will add to McMahan’s account of 
supra-persons. Second, we need to know the practical impact of the theoretical principles put 
forward earlier. In section 2.3 I argue that the implications of MS, MSI and CI previously 
discussed are untenable and should be abandoned.  
 2.2 A Conception of Radical Enhancement 
 As mentioned previously, the radically enhanced will likely experience a wide array of 
enhancements utilizing an array of technologies. While super-intelligence and athletic prowess 
are likely features of post-persons, what is often overlooked is some ability to modulate their 
inner life. Mere persons do this routinely, albeit in an indirect fashion. Music, mediation or a 
serene walk are readily available tools to attenuate stress and anxiety. To engage our empathy, 
we may focus on people who look like us, or we may focus on events that contain small numbers 
of people, as it is impossible to empathize with millions at once (Bloom, 2016, p. 31-34). To deal 
with the stressors of war soldiers often resort to telling “cold jokes,” jokes that dehumanize 
enemy combatants making it easier to kill and torture them (Glover, 1999, p. 36-37).  This small 
trick is well suited to our psychology which may be geared towards imbuing essential properties 
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on others (Smith, 2011, p. 32-34, 100-101). Most of our day is spent trying to control our mental 
states, for better or worse. More than two thousand years ago Sextus argued for skepticism as a 
form of medicine that would allow one to suspend judgment and enter ataraxia (Empiricus, 
1996). Buddhists took a different route and focused on meditation as the mechanism to 
ameliorate suffering (De-Bary & Bloom, 2000, p.435-440). In what follows I will discuss current 
technology that will give us greater access and control over our inner lives. I then speculate that 
increasing technology could give us the means to directly control our mental states. Direct 
mental state control will make the indirect tools of mere persons obsolete. 
 Deep brain stimulation (DBS) involves implanting electrodes in the brain to treat 
psychiatric and movement disorders. This technique is an improvement on earlier tissue removal 
surgeries as it allows for greater control (the ability to manipulate the stimulus) and is reversible, 
as the implants can be removed. Currently, only those patients who are resistant to traditional 
therapies are considered for DBS devices. DBS has shown limited success as a treatment for 
depression, anxiety, OCD, Tourette’s syndrome, Parkinson’s, anorexia, addiction, PTSD and 
aggressive behavior. One long term heroin patient even reported feeling decreases and increases 
of heroin cravings in response to different stimulation settings (Cleary et al. 2015). This 
technology can modulate our inner life and may one day be used outside of therapeutic contexts 
to enhance moods and curb unwanted behaviors such as addiction and aggression. DBS is still in 
its infancy, and not without substantial risks, but this technology can give insights into how the 
radically enhanced may one day function. 
 Optogenetics is similar to DBS in its invasive nature but differs mechanistically as it uses 
light to stimulate neurons as opposed to electricity. Opsins are light sensitive membrane proteins 
that are responsive to light. These proteins react to light in specific wavelengths and constitute 
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the first step in our visual pathway. With the aid of genetic technologies, opsins can be expressed 
in the brain, and in the presence of light can stimulate neurons rapidly in real time. This can 
allow for a more targeted approach than DBS as the optic fibers inserted in the brain can emit 
different wave lengths of light and only stimulate specific target cells (Aravanis et al. 2007). This 
technology can adjust the focus from broad adjustments (adjusting neurotransmitter level) to the 
fine-grained approach of targeting a circuit (Deisseroth, 2010). Optogenetics has been shown to 
modify both feeding and predatory behavior in mice.5  
 Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) began development in the late 1970’s. Non-invasive 
methods such as EEG have been used to move mouse cursors (Wolfpaw et al. 2004, McFarland 
et al. 1997), while the more invasive sensor implantation has been shown effective in cursor 
control and manipulation of prosthetic hands and robotic arms6 (Hochberg et al, 2006). The tasks 
being performed are still rudimentary and able-bodied persons would find the technology 
cumbersome. But it is readily conceivable that one day we will use this sort of technology to 
operate our phones and computers, and it is not a far leap from there to imagine it can be used to 
help modulate our inner lives. 
 If post-persons are to command their inner lives, DBS seems to be a poor option. It’s 
mode of delivery is too imprecise to give the sort of control I envision. However, the research 
gleamed from this technology will be invaluable in our understanding of the effects of direct 
 
5 A video of mice feeding behavior can be found at: 
https://neurocomplimenter.blogspot.com/2013/09/ While a video of predatory behavior can be 
found at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FlGbznBmx8M 
6 Videos of cursor manipulation (opening emails, drawing circles), gameplay (pong), and 
manipulating prosthetics are available in the supplementary information section of this paper 
available on Nature’s website. 
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neural intervention.7 Optogenetics is a more powerful tool, but is a long way off in humans, for 
practical and ethical reasons. Suppose we surpass these hurdles, why limit the use of a system 
like this to treat depression, OCD, or addictive behaviors?8 Why not incorporate fiber optics 
throughout the entire brain? Doing so would give the ability to enjoy the mental benefits of a 
long walk, from the comfort of your couch. The brain states would be identical in each case. 
Modulating our inner lives would be a daunting task for most users, but most of the work will be 
done by a central computer that will learn a specific brain and set presets for certain behaviors. 
The user then will be able to increase or decrease the stimulation based on need. These states will 
map the ones we routinely experience. Special education teachers may bookmark a calm or 
patient setting, enhancing their ability to engage with, and instruct their students. Athletes may 
opt to feel stimulated or enlivened when training and competing, enhancing their ability to stick 
to their daily regimens. Our most intimate mental states, our feelings of passion, lust and love 
can be modulated. This technology could be used to better match our partner’s emotional state or 
to aid in leaving a destructive relationship.9 
  This technology could be integrated seamlessly into our lives. Optogenetic fibers could 
be controlled by a small computer interface connected to a smartwatch. BCI could allow the user 
to manipulate this device with their mind, and in a matter of seconds, select the preset for the 
mood they seek. The user would then be free to make minor adjustments, increasing or 
decreasing the stimulus for greater comfort. This may not be appropriate in all situations, but it 
 
7 Future research on DBS greatly outweighs that of optogenetics as measured by upcoming 
clinical trials. These can be viewed at http://www.clinicaltrials.gov 
8 Those that endorse the treatment enhancement distinction will offer reasons not to enhance. I 
set this issue aside, as it is outside the scope of this paper. 
9 Some have argued that modulating our love lives is a morally desirable thing. For an extensive 
argument on this with practical tools in mind see Love Drugs (Earp & Savulescu, 2020). 
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will be appropriate for many. The idea is to give greater control in instances where mental states 
do not contribute to personal growth and well-being. It is not always beneficial to be mad at a 
loved one for a minor infraction or to be impatient with a stranger at the supermarket. The sort of 
control I envision can make these negative, destructive mental states go away in a more direct 
fashion than some of our indirect strategies. For those who may find this unsettling, is it really 
that much different from consuming alcohol after a stressful day at work? Or is it far different 
than drinking a glass of wine on a first date? My intuition is that it is not.10,11   
 One last enhancement focuses on pain diminution. Since optogenetics can play an 
inhibitory role, it seems plausible that it could be used to inhibit pain. This would be one way to 
tailor and dilute our response to painful stimuli. A simpler approach would be to alter the pain 
nerves themselves. Voltage gated sodium channels (Nav) play a role in pain signaling and are the 
target of research for new and less addictive analgesics (Offord, 2017). Nav 1.7 has garnered 
particular interest, as mutations have been identified that both greatly increase and reduce pain, 
while a complete Nav 1.7 knockout is non-lethal in humans (Dib-hajj et al. 2010). It seems 
unlikely that evolution selected for an optimal level of pain tolerance and our experience of it, 
but rather, only selected for the right amount to aid in survival and reproduction. Given that we 
live in a far different environment than our ancestors, it may be appropriate to alter our 
nociceptors themselves. The goal would not be the elimination of pain, but to dampen it. For 
 
10 As the ethics of enhancing are outside the scope of my argument, I will leave this point 
hanging. For those interested in exploring this point further see Neuroethics (2007) by Neil Levy. 
He argues for parity between traditional and technological methods of intervention 
11 Andy Clark has argued that we are natural born cyborgs (extended mind hypothesis), and that 
we are built to integrate technology into us. For numerous examples of how we naturally 
incorporate technology into our daily lives see Natural Born Cyborgs (Clark, 2003).  
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example, reducing Nav 1.7 expression might slightly raise our pain threshold, so that more of a 
painful stimulus is needed to evoke the pain response.  
 At this point, the difference between current technology and my account of the radically 
enhanced is magical. In a discussion on AI, Nick Bostrom has given several reasons to be wary 
of the prospects for technologies like DBS and BCI, and the timeframe they will be 
implemented. Several complications may occur which include infection from surgery and 
stimulating neural tissue outside the target zone. Additionally, there has only been limited 
success in therapeutic settings, and none in enhancement. It is far easier to bring someone back 
to baseline, than to improve their capacities. Our brains are finite machines with limited 
computing power. Adding chips to the brain may do little to aid our thinking, if the brain can 
only process information so fast (Bostrom, 2014, p. 63-67). Finally, much of the benefits these 
technologies afford could be done far cheaper, and without the risks associated with 
enhancement. Healthy skepticism is in order and warranted for the technologies I describe.  
 It may be worried that the conception of the enhanced I am arguing for are more like 
machines than humans. The worry is that they will be simple automata that will lose much of the 
inner life that makes our lives so valuable. If this was the goal I would argue for developing A.I. 
and then the replacement of humans. I am arguing that we should be able to better regulate out 
emotional life, rather than repudiate it. There already exists great variation in our ability to 
regulate our lives and the main feature of the radically enhanced is that their ability to regulate 
their emotional life will be augmented far beyond the capabilities of those that already exist.  
DBS, BCI and optogenetics are all key technologies that one day could be incorporated 
into the enhanced. Other technologies, such as modifying cellular biology, could be used to 
better match our biology to our environment. While these technologies are a long way off from 
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implementation for enhancement, they provide a guide to what the enhanced will be like. This 
section has been spent giving a plausible conception of how technology could be integrated to 
create the enhanced. There is room for caution and skepticism as the technology is still in its 
infancy. The point to keep in mind is that the enhanced may one day exhibit direct mental state 
control, and these beings should be kept in mind in the next section where I will test them against 
mere persons. 
2.3 Altering Moral Status- Two Test Cases 
 Recall Agar’s view of moral status, MS, a being’s entitlement to beneficial treatment and 
reduced eligibility to harmful treatment. If MS is right, then we should expect post-persons to 
receive preferential treatment in all cases. MS will be tested in a hypothetical organ donation 
case. 
Hospital: 
Imagine an ideal moral agent in need of an organ transplant. Unfortunately, the patient is too ill 
to be moved and there are no viable donors in the area. Two neighboring hospitals have 
volunteers to donate and are able to excise the organ. Hospital A is fully modernized offering 
every amenity, including anesthesia and analgesics. Hospital B, while modernized and safe, 
doesn’t believe in modern anesthetics or pain relievers. In all other respects, Hospital B is 
identical to Hospital A. Assuming there is some moral reason to donate an organ to this agent, 
although not a strong enough reason to force any agent to sacrifice herself, should the organ be 
procured from Hospital A or Hospital B? 
 
 Intuitively, Hospital A is the wiser choice. Much of the pain can be mitigated or outright 
eliminated, and the donor is far less likely to experience any trauma from either thinking about 
the upcoming surgery, or from actually undergoing the surgery while awake and alert. Hospital B 
can provide the same outcome as hospital A (one organ to a patient in need), but it is far riskier, 
more painful, and offers no additional benefit to that of hospital A. We can begin to imagine 
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Hospital A represents a post-person and hospital B represents a mere person. Mere persons have 
some limited techniques to mitigate pain and distress. During the operation they might try to 
regulate breathing or squeeze the hand of a close friend who has come for emotional support. 
Outside the procedure they may find external distractions like books, movies or music to avert 
their attention from the upcoming surgery. Post-persons on the other hand will have more direct 
control. Prior to the procedure they may directly lower their anxiety levels or imbue themselves 
with a general sense of peace about the surgery. During surgery, post-persons may exercise some 
of the inhibitory control of optogenetics and reduce their pain or outright block it from reaching 
conscious awareness. Assuming we have some moral reason to mitigate or prevent physical and 
psychological pain in others, then we have some reason to prefer the post-person in the organ 
donation case. Since both mere persons and post-persons have a moral reason to donate (for the 
benefit of an ideal moral agent), post-persons have an additional reason that mere persons lack 
(reduced physical pain and psychological distress). Since we have an additional reason to prefer 
post-persons, they should be preferred in this case. This provides some reason to think that we 
should reject Agar’s claim that the enhanced will enjoy a greater status than ordinary humans. 
 What if we exclude hospital B from the scenario, and imagine a mere and post-person in 
Hospital A? In this case who has greater reason to donate an organ?12 The prior reasoning 
suggests that there would be equal reason to donate between mere and post-persons. I think this 
is a mistake as mere persons are far more vulnerable, and so, along many more dimensions than 
post-persons. I will say more about vulnerability in what follows and greatly elaborate on it in 
section five.   
 
12 Thanks to Moti Gorin for bringing this scenario to my attention. 
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 This was a case of simple transplantation, but what happens in the event of an 
emergency, where it is guaranteed someone will die? McMahan worries mere persons will be 
more violable than post-persons (McMahan, 2009, p.601). Recall, MSI posits the enhanced will 
have greater inviolability than mere persons. One such real life, albeit modified, case is the 
sinking of the Titanic. On McMahan’s proposal the enhanced would be first on the life rafts. But 
for reasons similar to that of Hospital, I think they should go last. One reason mere persons will 
have priority is their sheer vulnerability. Their susceptibility to the fear of drowning and the pain 
of the cold frigid water, are among the reasons we think it impermissible to throw someone in the 
water. The enhanced, although incapable of surviving long periods in the cold, may lose out on 
all the pain of the ice water, and experience no fear of drowning or loss of life. If direct mental 
state control is taken into account, then we have some reason to think MSI will not dictate the 
enhanced board first, primarily, the enhanced will miss out on the pain and torment of drowning. 
Further, we may think of priority in terms of fair innings, where those that haven’t had the 
opportunity to experience a full life are given priority in life and death situations (Harris, 2001, 
p. 90-94). As the enhanced will have greater capacities, they will have had a better opportunity to 
experience a fuller range of life, in a shorter period of time. Even though they may be the same 
age, they have had more “innings” to play in the game of life, due to the fact that their cognitive 
capacities are greater than ours, by as much as ours are greater than non-human animals.13 These 
cognitive enhancements and novel forms of mental state control will make post-persons less 
 
13 It might be worried that post-persons will have objectively better lives. Even though they have 
had more experiences in the same amount of time, the future experiences they will miss out on 
will be worth more. I am wary of this reasoning. we generally accept the moral equality 
assumption. We typically don’t think it appropriate to assign more value to the lives of those 
with greater cognitive capacities when compared to the cognitively challenged. The point of this 
addition is to highlight that we can begin to compound reasons to think the radically enhanced 
will have a lower moral status than mere persons.  
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vulnerable to the harms that plague our lives. I propose any account of moral status must be 
phrased in terms of vulnerability. As moral status is directly tied to vulnerability we get moral 
status as vulnerability or MSV: 
(MSV): Moral status as vulnerability. The greater a being’s susceptibility to harm (mental or 
physical), the greater the protections that are afforded, and hence, the greater an agent’s 
moral status.  
We need not completely abandon MSI as it does tell us that we are not items that can be readily 
sacrificed. The enhanced should not be harmed or, in this case, be thrown overboard on a whim, 
as they have a great degree of inviolability, they just have less of this inviolability conferring 
property than mere persons possess. One often overlooked element of what constitutes moral 
status is vulnerability. I will greatly expand on vulnerability in section 5. For now vulnerability 
can be thought of in an intuitive everyday sense. What should be apparent from the cases of 
hospital and titanic is the greater the vulnerability of any agent, the greater the moral concern. As 
moral concern grows so does an agent’s moral status. With this in mind we can return to our test 
cases and compare MSV against the concerns of Buchanan. 
 As we saw Buchanan has expressed concerns about enhanced cooperators edging simple 
cooperators out of the dominant cooperative framework.14 Recall that CI states the enhanced will 
have a different set of interests and a richer set of rights guaranteeing their interests take priority. 
One common interest between mere and post-persons will be exhibiting autonomy, contributing 
 
14 Robert Sparrow raises a stronger concern. Enhancements may proceed so quickly that those 
born just a few years later will render those just a few years ahead obsolete. This means one 
could be forced out their career at the age of 25 or so (Sparrow, 2019). Given our psychology, it 
seems reasonable to worry that this will have negative effects. But, if post-persons are more 
psychologically immune, then we may reduce our concern for the psychological well-being of 
the radically enhanced. 
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to society and a general feeling that these contributions have a sense of purpose and meaning. 
Whose interest do we keep in mind, the simple or enhanced cooperator? As the enhanced have 
greater control over their mental states (jealousy, rage, boredom, self-worth), it seems that two 
things are likely to happen. First, the enhanced cooperators can enter mental states that make 
them amenable to cooperating at a lower level. Playing Go Fish has its upside when you are 
playing with children. If post-persons are smarter than mere persons, to the degree that mere 
persons are smarter than non-human animals, it is fair to say that mere persons will be like 
children in the eyes of the enhanced.15As adults we become frustrated with children over 
extended periods of time, but we lack the capabilities of the enhanced. The enhanced will have 
the capacity to be far more patient and will be able to sustain cooperation for much longer, as 
they can mitigate their irritation and boredom. Praise need not be a central motivation of the 
enhanced. We feel cheated when our accomplishments go unrecognized and are beyond 
indignant if our accomplishments are credited to someone else. It does not follow that features of 
our psychology will be predominant features of the enhanced. The enhanced may be far happier 
that a positive impact is made, rather than receiving credit for it, and if they aren’t, they will have 
the tools to foster this sentiment. They will recognize that mere persons need to cooperate to 
grow as individuals and put their ideas on the sideline so mere persons can contribute. Second, 
their superior cognitive powers may give them the ability to more clearly identify errors in 
ethical and general reasoning. Finally, the enhancements I offered are a narrow window of what 
 
15 Francesca Minerva Makes a similar point about cryonics. One worry is that if you freeze 
yourself for an extended period of time your revival will depend on the kindness of future post-
persons. As these post-persons will have little interest in reviving a mere-person, the revival 
won’t happen. One line she pursues is that if the post-persons are advanced enough they may 
have a relationship to us the way we have relationships with dogs. Socialization and love for one 
another can still occur (P. 37) 
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the radically enhanced may be like. They may undergo specific moral disposition enhancements. 
One such method that has been proposed is to “attenuate counter-moral emotions.” Such 
emotions might include aversion to racial groups and impulse toward violent aggression 
(Douglas, 2008, p. 231). If moral disposition enhancement occurs along the way, the enhanced 
will not experience anything like the out-group hostility that is all too routine in our society. The 
combination of direct mental state control, increased rationality and specific moral enhancement 
provide compelling reasons to think the enhanced will not believe they have superior rights and 
interests to our own. 
The second point (enhanced cognitive abilities) needs more attention. In the next section I 
will argue that enhancing our cognitive abilities can serve as a moral disposition enhancer.  
2.4 Cognitive Enhancement 
 One way to think about cognitive enhancements is in terms of raw computing power. 
The enhanced may become better calculators or better fact accumulators16. Cognitive abilities 
understood in this way are not terribly interesting, as there already exists great variation in 
ability, and computers perform many basic tasks for us regularly. The sorts of cognitive 
enhancements we should aim for are ones that increase our ability to abstract17. If the radically 
enhanced deserve to be called post-persons, they will more readily use abstraction in their 
reasoning, and quite possibly in a way that is off limits to us. If mere persons are better 
 
16 30 million adults in the US can’t read. Twice that number have basic reading skills (Baer et al. 
2009). How much different would the world be if the average level was above proficient? At 
minimum, the level of discourse in the public sphere would be far higher 
17 Persson and Savulescu (2012) argue that the cause of our problems is our thinking. For 
example, pollution is a symptom of climate change, but our thinking is the cause. They argue the 
best way to solve moral problems is to enhance our psychology. 
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abstractors, then they will have better insight into conflicting propositions. This will result in 
more coherent views, and increase the probability of solving contemporary moral problems. 
To illustrate what I have in mind we can focus on wealth inequality, one contemporary 
problem that currently occupies the public’s mind. The ten richest men in the world each have 
wealth in excess of fifty billion dollars. The top three have more than twice that. Some think this 
is perfectly appropriate, and even morally good. But what if this vast wealth was not represented 
by ones and zeros in complex investment mechanisms, or tied up in physical assets like luxury 
properties and yachts, but rather in raw goods necessary for survival?18 What if billionaires were 
explicitly Grinchy? 
The Grinchy Billionaire: 
Imagine a wealthy billionaire shifts his investments from long term assets to physical 
goods that are necessary to maintain a life worth living. He invests in medicines like insulin and 
vaccines, while diversifying his portfolio with stores of clean water and durable food products 
like grains and rice. The Grinchy Billionaire decides to store these goods in the center of towns 
in developing countries, just out of arms reach of those people who are desperately in need. This 
billionaire is patient and has taken a long-term investment strategy, waiting for the goods to 
become scarce, or some other market mechanism to take effect so he can increase profits. 
Naturally, people will try to steal these goods (as it can mean the difference between life and 
death), so armed guards will be hired to secure the compound. Does this seem moral?  
 
My intuition is no, but I am not concerned with the conclusion as much as the influence 
of abstraction on our reasoning. The enhanced will engage in this sort of reasoning automatically 
and they will compare this case against ten, twenty or a hundred cases to see which intuitions are 
being pumped,19 and which intuitions are worth preserving. This sort of reasoning can help tease 
 
18 At the time of this writing the coronavirus pandemic is in a stage of nascent growth. In the 
U.S. the government response may include paid sick leave, bailouts for business, cash payments 
to individuals and subsidized health care. All of this requires wealth redistribution. In a trenchant 
opinion piece Farhad Manjoo highlights how we are all socialists in a pandemic (2020). 
19 See Dennett (2013) 
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apart a mere difference from a moral difference. My own intuition is that the method of storing 
wealth is a mere, and not a moral difference. So, if you find the Grinchy billionaire morally 
impermissible, you should think the same of the regular billionaire.     
The previous point was to establish the power of abstraction and how it may aide in our 
ethical and general reasoning. While the thought experiment purported to be about wealth 
inequality, it is really about enhancement. Buchanan notes the inequality already present between 
developed and developing countries “In fact, we already live in such a world: the world’s worst-
off people are unenhanced compared with the best off. On average, people in ‘developed’ 
countries are taller, stronger, healthier, better able to produce and create more, better able to 
develop their talents, better able to promote their own values, and longer-lived than people in 
‘less-developed’ countries” (Buchanan, 2009, p. 357). Buchanan is talking about the importance 
of a concept like human rights, and that even though those in developed countries are better off, 
the concept of human rights tells us we have obligations to provide basic living conditions to 
those that are less well off. The claim in no way makes reference to notions of superiority or 
inferiority. If we accept that better diets, access to health care, and education constitute 
enhancements, then wealthy elites, like the Grinchy Billionaire, can be thought of as post-
persons,20 and the impoverished can be thought of as mere persons. For those that are concerned 
with the enhanced edging people out of society, promoting their own interests, they should be 
equally concerned with the wealthy, who do that now. Naturally, those whose intuitions conflict 
could align them. They could either shift their concerns to include enhancements and wealth 
 
20 The analogy could just as easily be made within affluent states. The prospects and outcome for 
someone with a PhD in evolutionary biology are much different than that of the local Sasquatch 
hunter. 
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inequality or abandon concerns for both. The enhanced will have the tools and capacities to not 
make such obvious mistakes in reasoning.  
A large portion of the opposition to enhancement come from religious conservatives.21 A 
full 61% of adults in the US think there is too much wealth inequality, but only 41% of 
conservatives think so. Further, 60% of conservatives think wealth inequality is driven by life 
choices (Horrowitz et al, 2020). If I am right that wealth inequality and enhancement are far 
more alike than not, and conservatives oppose enhancement, but are ok with wealth inequality, 
then there is a mistake in reasoning happening somewhere. One candidate is in how the scenarios 
are framed (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 36). The ability to abstract is one tool to overcome 
pernicious framing effects. More worrying is that only 6% of conservatives (and 13% of liberals) 
think that philosophy and reason are a source of guidance on right and wrong, while 87% of 
conservatives think religion and common sense are sufficient guides to morality (Religion in 
America, 2015). This is even reflected in philosophy at the highest level. Leon Kass, a 
bioconservative who has served on the president’s council of bioethics, has famously argued for 
the wisdom of disgust (Kass,1997). The enhanced, knowing full well that they were not created 
by a divine artificer, will have reason to be skeptical of their primal intuitions and appreciate the 
role careful thinking plays in creating a moral society. The benefits conferred by increasing our 
cognitive capacities are unknown, but it is difficult to imagine that better thinkers will make the 
errors we routinely make.  
It might be objected that since I think wealth inequality is impermissible, and since the 
enhanced are analogous to the Grinchy Billionaire, I should treat the cases equally and argue 
 
21 Leon Kass (2017) offers a conservative, catholic objections. Francis Fukuyama (2002) offers 
objections in a secular, albeit conservative manner. 
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against enhancement. The analogy falls apart as the Grinchy Billionaire is all too human. I would 
be against enhancement if the goal was to create better athletes, entertainers and those that can 
create algorithms to better track the stock market, but these are only a small fraction of the goals 
of enhancement. If we enhance the things that make humans so wonderful, if we enhance the 
ability for careful reflection, or the ability to exercise compassion, then post-persons won’t 
embody the Grinchy Billionaire. 
2.5 Moral Status & Vulnerability 
 Our vulnerabilities may be exploited in the form of oppression (Frye, 1983), as a way to 
exclude from political and social life (Mill, 1869), or as way to justify differential treatment and 
instill obedience in women (Wollstonecraft, 1792). Vulnerability may vary by group. Not 
because one group is intrinsically more vulnerable than the next, but because group membership 
can serve as a way to identify, impose and uphold pernicious societal norms. These norms have 
forced women to fight for the right to govern their own bodies (Thompson, 1971). Same sex 
couples have to battle for equal treatment and, in the case of gay men, are often thought of as 
disgusting or viewed as contaminants (Nussbaum, 2004, p. 113). The disabled have to argue that 
their differences are mere differences, as opposed to bad differences (Barnes, 2014), and those 
that suggest that racism, the most visible form of discrimination is still a problem, are met with 
public backlash (Yancy, 2018). As important as these issues are, they fall outside of the scope of 
this paper. The radically enhanced will be sufficiently different than us, warranting their 
vulnerability to be thought of as different in kind. Martha Nussbaum captures the idea of 
vulnerability well. 
But the idea of vulnerability is closely connected to the idea of emotion. Emotions are 
responses to these areas of vulnerability, responses in which we register the damages we 
have suffered, might suffer, or luckily have failed to suffer. To see this, let us imagine 
beings who are really invulnerable to suffering, totally self-sufficient… Such beings 
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would have no reason to fear, because nothing that could happen to them would be 
really bad. They would have no reasons for anger, because none of the damages other 
people could do to them would be a truly significant damage, touching on matters of 
profound importance. They would have no reasons for grief, because, being self-
sufficient, they would not love anything outside themselves, at least not with the needy 
human type of love that gives rise to profound loss and depression. Envy and jealousy 
would similarly be absent from their lives (Nussbaum, 2004, p.6). 
 
Post-persons will not be totally self-sufficient in a god-like manner, but they will be 
much closer than mere persons are. If we lack moral concern for gods, and the reason is their 
lack of vulnerability, then we have some reason to include vulnerability as a criterion for moral 
status. Post-persons, on my account, will be far less vulnerable, and hence, warrant less moral 
concern. Vulnerability is a scalar property, one that should be viewed in terms of weak 
thresholds, of which, adding to, and taking from, make a great difference to moral status. 
As alluded to earlier, the difference in vulnerability of mere persons is incidental rather 
than intrinsic. We are all in the same boat, but in different seas. For example, a refugee will be 
highly vulnerable, as she might be in a new country, unfamiliar with the language and customs, 
and looked at as an out-group member. But this is an accident of nature. If the Grinchy 
Billionaire loses his fortune and becomes a refugee, he will be just as vulnerable as the typical 
refugee. He is still in the same boat, but in a different sea. Our circumstances change the degree 
of our vulnerability, but not our vulnerability in kind. The enhanced are much different. They 
will be in the same sea as us, but in a different boat. The experience of an enhanced refugee will 
be unlike that of the millions of refugees in desperate need of aid. To capture our intrinsic 
vulnerability, absent the baggage of unjust societal norms, I want to focus on our sensitivity to 
insult and our ability and composure to rebuff them. 
 Southern white men grow up in cultures of honor where they are expected to defend 
themselves reflexively against insult. Social status is called into questions for those men who 
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aren’t “men” and don’t exhibit lax talionis—the law of retribution. This behavior is found on and 
off the farm, as one study found differences in responses to insult among Southern and Northern 
college students. In this study, participants were bumped into and then insulted (called an 
asshole) by a researcher. Southern students’ levels of cortisol and testosterone increased more so 
than their Northern counterparts after the bump and insult. Southerners felt that others perceived 
them as having less social status, and when given an opportunity to demonstrate their toughness 
by being administered electrical shocks, they opted for higher levels than their Northern 
counterparts. They were even more likely to exhibit aggressive behavior towards others after the 
bump and insult (Cohen et al, 1996). White republican men, with a high school education who 
live in rural areas are most likely to be gun owners and cite protection as the number one reason 
for ownership22 (The Demographics of Gun Ownership, 2017). Data from twin studies suggest 
there is a genetic component to political beliefs (Funk Et al, 2013), and fMRI has been used to 
predict political party affiliation by mere exposure to non-political images (Ahn et al, 2014). 
While honor culture and conservative attitudes certainly have a cultural component, they may 
have a genetic component as well. Are these white men more vulnerable than their northern 
counterparts? If so, do they deserve more moral status? 
The answer to the first question is both yes and no. They have emotional responses to 
insults, that others may readily brush off. They may even be disposed to view mild insults as 
damaging and elicit an emotional response. Defending your territory and manhood all day is both 
taxing and dangerous. But this isn’t drastically different than our general vulnerability in 
 
22 Women are the least likely to own weapons. This is odd in that women are far more likely to 
be victims of sexual assault and domestic violence. Given that women are in some instances 
more vulnerable to physical abuses, you would expect them to own the most guns if gun 
ownership is really about protection. While gun ownership among white men may be related to 
protection, I speculate that honor culture and protecting “manhood” play a pivotal role.  
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different contexts.  For example, if a northern undergraduate is told her idea is risible in front of 
the class, she may have similar physiological and emotional responses to those in honor cultures. 
In the U.S., FERPA laws are in place to ensure education records are kept private, sparing 
students from the pain and embarrassment of sharing a poor performance. For college students, 
good grades may serve as a mark of social status, and those that struggle may perceive that 
others think they have a lower social status. So the vulnerability is different in degree and type, 
but not in kind. The cultural and genetic lottery will shape what bothers us, and how it does, but 
we are all still in the same boat, only the context of the seas change. We can now answer the 
second question. Those that are more vulnerable through the combination of the cultural and 
genetic lottery do not deserve more moral status, as a change in a moral status threshold requires 
a change in vulnerability along many dimensions to an extent that it changes vulnerability in 
kind.  
The enhanced will be far less vulnerable along several dimensions, enough to lower their 
moral status. Insults will not readily bother them (as they do not bother many mere persons), and 
when they do, they will have the capacity to reduce the severity of the blow. They will not be 
ashamed of poor performance in athletics or academics, because it will be obvious that those that 
excel in certain areas will have different enhancements. It will be readily apparent that their 
talents are not entirely their own. It will become far more obvious the degree to which our 
genetic and technological enhancements supplement character and drive our performances. Post-
persons will be less manipulatable. Mere persons love rewards, even for the most trivial of 
accomplishments, such as the badges and awards ubiquitous in mobile applications. They will 
have control over their dopamine driven reward pathway, allowing them to recoup their time, 
and focus on things that really matter.  
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Finally, decreasing vulnerability will make post-persons more moral. Direct mental state 
control will allow them to exhibit the virtue of courage or allow them to curb the desire to 
deceive. Following moral rules like “never lie” will become the rule, and not the exception. They 
will abandon lax-talionis, and focus on ways to improve the quality of life for people in great 
need, as opposed to creating more pain.23 They will be more generous, as they will have the 
capacity to feel the same excitement towards a traditional lottery ticket, as one whose grand prize 
is millions of dollars to charity. For the radically enhanced both a single and a million deaths will 
be a tragedy.  
2.6 Objections: 
 Many will still be worried that the enhanced will not be nearly as altruistic as I have 
argued for. I will concede that nothing necessitates the enhanced to be benevolent beings. But 
necessity is too high of a bar to set. We set the bar far lower for the sorts of interventions we 
already employ. Imagine if we thought it necessary for educational interventions to guarantee 
smarter and more moral citizens before we implemented them. Instead, we hope that these sorts 
of interventions make an on average contribution to the quality of children’s lives. On average, 
we hope they are better able to cope with the demands of contemporary society. The same should 
be thought of for the radically enhanced. They will be in a far better position to realize errors in 
 
23 Katrien Devolder has argued that prisoners have the right to die. She focuses on the case of 
Frank Van Den Bleeken, a serial rapist and murder. He admits to his crimes and feels he is 
beyond recovery. And yet, is destined to a life of imprisonment (2016). For a brief period of time 
the court ruled he could be euthanized. One victim’s sister remarked “For us this is 
incomprehensible. He should rot in his cell” (Bletchly & Allen, 2014). The court later overturned 
their ruling, ensuring Bleeken will live. There is a real question as to what sorts of punishments 
are appropriate, and for how long they should be meted out. If it was up to family members of 
victims, I fear that the punishment would be indefinite. The Christian concept of Hell is an apt 
reminder of how much we cherish and enjoy punishing others. 
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reasoning and have the tools to better curb unwanted desires and impulses. But this will be no 
utopia. As with all populations, there will be variation, and there will still be those we need 
protection from. It will take an enormous effort to figure out the science of improving humanity, 
but it strains credulity to think this is unachievable or unlikely through enhancement. If you are 
worried that the enhanced will be worse in some ways than us, consider de-enhancements, the 
interventions that make us les intelligent and less physically and cognitively capable. Would we 
be better off? Hesitation in response may be due to a status quo bias (Bostrom & Ord, 2006), or 
an imagined hope that we are the pinnacle of perfection. However, I find it hard to imagine that 
if we stumbled across human-like beings whose capacities were greater than ours by a mere 5%, 
that we should encourage them to reduce their capacities to match our own.  
 What does MSV mean for animals? Surely, they are more vulnerable than us. Do they 
deserve more moral status? Maybe, but this is an empirical question we are unable to answer at 
the moment. We have reasons to think animals experience pain like we do. They have similar 
anatomy and physiology, and their behavior indicates they are capable of pain. But their inner 
life is probably drastically different. I hesitate to speculate what it is like, but I am comfortable 
saying that like the enhanced, animals are in a different boat, but this time in the opposite 
direction. Their inner lives are most likely not anywhere near as rich as ours, and they probably 
are incapable of feeling some of the deepest senses of sadness and loss that we are. Again, this is 
an empirical question, and if it turned out they had rich inner lives and are far more susceptible 
to emotional pains, would it be so bad if we elevated their moral status? It would certainly be 
weird and uncomfortable to view a dairy cow the same as a human, but that would seem far more 
preferable than treating them the way we currently do. I think we have little to worry on this 
front, but time will tell.  
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 It is often argued that emotional and physical pain are good things. It helps us grow into 
mature individuals and prevents us from injuring ourselves to the point of no return. But it is not 
necessary as evidenced by Jo Cameron, a 71-year-old woman who experiences little anxiety and 
described childbirth as a tickle (Murphy, 2019). I am not suggesting a complete removal of pain, 
but with the help of technology such as optogenetics we may alter our relationship to it, freeing 
us from the bondage it keeps us in. There is no reason giving birth needs to be extremely painful, 
just like there is no reason to fear public speaking. How much pain we do and don’t need is an 
empirical question. If we start enhancing, we can answer this along the way. My optimism may 
need some bridling, but the alternative is to trust that natural selection got it right. I find this as 
implausible as the hypothesis we were created by an all knowing, all kind, all powerful deity. 
 Finally, this is a speculative account and should be treated as such.  My aim is not to 
describe how the enhanced will actually be, rather, it is to give a plausible conception of the 
enhanced and establish that they could have a lower moral status than humans, despite increased 
capacities and abilities. On this front I think I succeeded.  
2.7 Conclusion 
 I have argued that it is likely humans will seek out enhancements that allow for greater 
mental state control. It is readily assumed that enhancement will have the effect of raising moral 
status or, at minimum, confer some additional rights the unenhanced will lack. As greater mental 
state control can reduce one’s vulnerability, and vulnerability is a criterion for moral status, the 
enhanced will experience a moral status reduction when compared to their ordinary human 
counterparts. If I am right about the enhanced it is not their attitudes towards us we should be 
most afraid of, it is our attitudes toward them.  
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Chapter 3: On the Reasons to Enhance 
 The radically enhanced will not become a reality for many decades—if not longer. Why, 
given the fact that they don’t exist, should we invest resources into creating them? Agar has 
argued that we have no obligation to create radically enhanced beings, and as there is risk 
associated with this process, we shouldn’t create the enhanced. This chapter will be spent 
addressing this question. I disagree with Agar’s analysis and argue we do have an obligation to 
create the radically enhanced. The first part of this chapter will be spent getting clear on Agar’s 
view. Next, I will outline the non-identity problem and a variation on the psychological 
continuity view of personal identity, both provided by Derek Parfit. I will then introduce what I 
call the competing known identity problem and I will argue that in solving this problem we will 
have sufficient reasons to create the enhanced. The aim of this chapter will not be to provide a 
decisive refutation of Agar’s claim, rather it will be to outline one possible solution. Much of this 
chapter will rely on controversial claims. I will provide a groundwork for further dismantling 
Agar’s views, and future work will be aimed at the more difficult task of providing defeaters. 
3.1 Agar & The Absence of Reasons to Create the Radically Enhanced 
 Chapter 2 was spent arguing against Agar’s claim that the enhanced will have a greater 
status than us, hence removing one obstacle to creating the radically enhanced. Agar gives five 
reasons why we should not create the enhanced outside of moral status. They are: 1. 
Transformative change. 2. Internal goods and the anthropocentric ideal. 3. The process of 
enhancing is entirely different than that of the normal stages of aging. 4.The ability to procure 
external goods through other means. 5. Humans cannot survive the enhancement process. I will 
expand more on all points except point three (enhancing and aging are sufficiently different), 
which I reserve for the penultimate section. 
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 Agar’s first point is about transformative change. The radically enhanced will be 
sufficiently different from us. So much so that we will have to reevaluate our experiences, beliefs 
and attitudes (Agar, 2014, p.6). Agar invites us to imagine that we undergo an experience 
analogous to that of the 1956 film Invasion of the Body Snatchers. A biological agent makes its 
way to earth, where it is capable of making exact replicas of every human being. These Replicas, 
or pod people (as they are created in organic pods) then kill their ordinary human counterparts. 
While the pod people look human, they have a radically different psychology shedding human 
proclivities—such as their deep emotional lives. Agar assumes that identity will be preserved 
between the pod-people and their original human counter parts (I will say more about identity in 
a later section) but finds the transformation process troubling. For Agar, the pod-people undergo 
a similar process as those that would undergo radical enhancement. As we have reservations 
about the pod-people, we should have reservations about radically enhancing. In essence the 
radically enhanced will be nothing like us, as they will have undergone too drastic a change.  
 The radically enhanced will most likely have a better objective picture of the world, and 
for them the transformation will be a good thing. But each will have a notion of what comprises 
a good life, and what is a good life for a human does not mean it will be a good life for the 
enhanced and vice versa. What must be accounted for is if that agent will think the 
transformative change will be good for them (Agar, 2014, p.11). While the future or enhanced 
person will still survive, the changes will be seen through a different lens, one that they will be 
happy with, but the former agent would not find valuable. Take for instance the case of the pod 
people who lacked emotion. They have radically different evaluative frameworks, and for Agar 
we should occupy the viewpoint of each agent respectively and through the lens of what is 
important to them (Agar, 2014, p. 13). 
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 The second point is an extension of the first. There are goods that are internal, that is, 
they have intrinsic value. And there are goods that are external and provide instrumental value. 
External goods are brought about by technology and do things for us. They make our lives easier 
and more fluid and can increase our health and productivity. Internal goods are those that give 
meaning to our life, what Agar calls the anthropocentric ideal24 (Agar, 2014, p. 28). As the 
radically enhanced will have a different viewpoint, they will have different internal goods. For 
us, we marvel at the achievements of our fellow humans because their accomplishments make 
sense in a framework tailored to our abilities. Even though most of us will never manage to run a 
2-hour marathon, we can identify with those that do. The reason for this is because of simulation 
theory, where “we predict and explain the actions of others by simulating the mental processes 
behind them” (Agar, 2014, p. 37). Since we are sufficiently similar to other humans we can 
engage with others in a semi-veridical manner, imagining we are them, or could be in their 
shoes, making their accomplishments meaningful to us. At some range of enhancement, we will 
no longer be able to simulate the victories of the enhanced (perhaps running a 30-minute 
marathon, or doing differential equations while composing a symphony), so those 
accomplishments will lose value to us. This does not mean we shouldn’t enhance; it just means 
there is some range where we will place value on and can identify with others and appreciate 
their accomplishments (Agar, 2014, p. 42).  
 The enhanced will undoubtedly have better access and means of acquiring external, 
objective goods than us, but we can also pursue them through external means as enhancing 
technology (point three) (Agar, 2014, p. 46). Since we can have the benefits of external goods 
and preserve the internal goods to us, Agar argues we should choose to limit the prospects to 
 
24 Agar uses Alasdair MacIntyre’s analysis here. 
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moderate enhancement, as we procure all the benefits and don’t lose out on the internal goods 
the radically enhanced do.  
 The fourth point is about human survival; Agar thinks humans will not survive this sort 
of transformation (Agar, 2014, p. 56). He assumes psychological connectedness is sufficient for 
personal identity. If you are sufficiently psychologically similar to your former self, then you 
have survived. Sameness over time generally relies on a chain of memory; Agar’s focus is on 
autobiographical memory and he argues the radically enhanced will lose their autobiographical 
memories. We tend to remember things that have a significant value to us. As our cognitive 
powers increase, many of our accomplishments will be seen as less significant. Combine this 
with longer life spans, and the need or want to remember some of our human accomplishments 
disappears (Agar, 2014, p.64). Why would it be important to someone their struggles with 
fractions, if they are busy struggling with defining a theory of everything? Or why would 
memories of learning to hit a tee ball stay intact when one is training for the home run derby. We 
will become progressive forgetters and as psychological continuity is the criterion for survival 
over time, we will forget who we are and won’t survive. 
 I will talk about the final point how aging and enhancement are different in section 3.5.  
We will return to the other concerns in section 3.5 as they will serve to objections of my own 
view. The next section will be spent getting clear on the non-identity problem. I will follow with 
a discussion on personal and identity and then use what I call the competing known identity 
problem to argue that we do in fact have reasons to enhance.  
3.2 The Nonidentity Problem 
 As of now, the radically enhanced don’t exist. This may one day change if our policies 
are aimed at enhancement. Mere and Post-persons will live together. Some have argued these 
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mere persons will be worse off if we allow enhancement to proceed. There may be risks to their 
psychological well-being, as well as their ability to contribute and find meaning in ordinary life 
(Sparrow, 2019). But, had we not enhanced, those people would never have existed. It raises the 
question—How are they worse off? This is the non-identity problem. It will be explored in much 
greater detail in what follows.  
 We are all lucky enough to be conceived when we were. Had our parents met different 
partners, or had they conceived at a later date, different people would have been born. Hairs can 
be split about how close to the time of conception is important for identity conserving properties 
to remain intact, but we know our genes (which contribute to who we are) are derived from the 
combination of a sperm and ovum. Female reproductive cells are present at birth and have a 
short life cycle (30 days) once they reach maturity and are capable of being fertilized. We can 
imagine that at maximum any fertilization outside of 30 days (roughly) will result in a different 
child25 (Parfit, 1987, p. 352). Call this the time dependence claim. If we choose policies that 
allow for enhancement the world will be a different place than it otherwise would have been. By 
the time we are capable of radical enhancement these policies will have had far and reaching 
effects. Different jobs will be available and the people that will be born will have different 
interests, suggesting that people will meet different partners, in different places and conceive at 
different times. We can see the nonidentity problem in action with a couple of imagined, albeit 
everyday cases. 
 
25 This is overly cautious. Millions of sperm race to fertilize the ovum and only one is successful. 
Any changes to the initial conditions of the race are likely to have profound consequences. For 
example, if ejaculation occurs at a later time, or in a different position in the vagina, the “edge” 
each sperm will have will be different. And, as sperms are more or less clones, it is likely a 
different sperm will make its way to the egg, if any make it at all.  
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 Parfitt invites us to imagine the case of a young, 15-year-old girl, who wants to have a 
child. At her age she is ill equipped to provide any prospective child with the opportunity a more 
established parent could provide. She could wait, and the child that is born will have a better start 
in life. But this will result in a different child being born. Assuming the child who is born when 
the girl is 15 has a life worth living, how can we say he is worse off, if the alternative is to wait, 
and that alternative means non-existence (Parfit, 1987, p. 358-59)? Does any harm occur to the 
child if the young girl does not wait? If so, it is difficult to say why.  
 This problem is not just about conception of individuals, but also the policies that alter 
our environment. Imagine we choose between two economic policies. We can either deplete or 
conserve our resources. Depletion will increase the well-being for those individuals that 
currently exist, while lowering the well-being of those that live in the distant future. 
Conservation will have a minimal effect on those that are currently alive, while greatly 
increasing the well-being of those in the far future (Parfit, 1987, p. 361-3). But, as we have seen, 
different policies will create different persons. Different jobs will be available in different towns, 
different people will meet, and different people will be born. Assuming both policies create 
persons with lives worth living, do we harm any individual person if the alternative means 
nonexistence? Intuitively we want to say polluting the environment, or having a child early in 
life causes harm, but the non-identity problem shows that it is difficult to explain why. 
 This section has been spent getting clear on the nonidentity problem. The problem is that 
it intuitively feels wrong to bring a person into existence if they are worse off in some way. 
However, they cannot be worse off, if they live a life worth living, and the alternative is 
nonexistence. I will attempt to provide a reason as to why any individual is worse off despite the 
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alternative being nonexistence in section 3.4. The heart of section 3.4 is an argument for creating 
the radically enhanced. Fort this to be clear I will first need to say more about personal identity. 
3.3 Personal Identity 
 There is no dearth of views on what constitutes personal identity. In this section, I want to 
focus and motivate just one. Parfit argues for psychological continuity with any cause. While 
there is much controversy over this version of the view, Agar and Parfit generally agree. Since 
Agar adopts a version of the psychological continuity view, this will be the only view I explore 
as my proximate aim is to respond to Agar’s objections. Other, less controversial views of 
personal identity seem well suited to achieve my ultimate aim, which is to argue that we should 
allow beings to grow into the sorts of beings they would want to become i.e. the radically 
enhanced. For those who adopt other views, I hope you are able to see much overlap between the 
account I provide, and your own account. I will argue that we have reasons to create the radically 
enhanced in section 3.4, for now we can turn our attention to Derek Parfit’s view of personal 
identity. 
 We can begin with a simple thought experiment. You are transported from earth to Mars 
in an instant. This teleportation involves the scanning of the precise atomic configuration of your 
body and rearranges new atoms on the planet Mars just moments later. Your earth-bound body is 
destroyed in the process. Do you successfully teleport and survive? It seems like you may, and in 
fact you may use this transporting device many times over the coming years. But what happens if 
the earth-bound body is never destroyed? When you look face to face with your clone on mars, 
which one will be the real you (Parfit, 1987, p. 199-200)? For Parfit there is no difference 
between these cases. Replication is just as good as ordinary survival. I agree, and I will motivate 
this more in what follows. 
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 What is preserved in these cases is not our bodies, or our souls, it is our memories. The 
original body is destroyed, and the new body is composed of different atoms. Our memories 
need not be identical over time, as a sufficient overlap of memory is enough to confer identity. I 
don’t remember everything of my former self, but I do remember enough to still be the same 
person. Parfit argues that psychological continuity—is just the holding of these overlapping 
chains of connectedness and that this is all that matters for survival. It is often thought that these 
chains of connectedness, or continuity, as it is often referred to, has to have the right kind of 
cause, which is a normal cause (Parfit, 1987, p. 207). Parfit has argued for what he calls Relation 
R, which allows for memory conservation through any cause (Parfit, 1987, 215). For Parfit (and 
Agar), a pod-person will survive as a continuation of her former earth self. Most of us would find 
this distressing as it is intuitive that once we modify the teletransportation case it seems like we 
die. It is much more apparent, and the intuition far stronger that we fail to survive in the case of 
the pod-people. Parfit finds these thoughts distressing as well, but he accepts that personal 
identity isn’t what matters for survival. What matters is the continuation of memories. He 
reaches this conclusion because our bodies, brains and minds are different throughout our entire 
lives. While survival through pod-people isn’t all that good, ordinary survival doesn’t fare much 
better. What this means is that there is no central “I”, there is just successive experiences being 
had by some overlapping set of memories. Split brain patients may provide some insight into 
why this is the case. 
 Split-brain surgeries have been around since the 1940’s and often used as a treatment for 
epilepsy. This surgery requires the separation of the corpus callosum, a network of fibers that 
connects the two hemispheres of the brain. Those that undergo this procedure still feel as if they 
are a unified self, but under experimental conditions they find that many cognitive processes are 
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running independent of each other. One experiment focuses on showing an image in only one 
visual field. When an image is shown in the right visual field (it moves to the left hemisphere), 
the patient can tell the experimenter in words what the image was. When the image is presented 
to the left visual field, the patient cannot identify it verbally, but can draw it out (Wolman, 2012). 
The hemispheres are acting independently, and if they can work independently on small 
problems, why not act independently for much larger problems? 
Parfit imagines what it would be like for the two hemispheres to work completely 
independent of each other.26 Imagine taking a physics exam where you encounters a difficult 
question. Two strategies become apparent to you, and you are unsure which one has a greater 
chance of success. As you have a split-brain, you can assign each hemisphere one strategy and 
let each go to work. You are aware of one solution that is being worked on but notice your other 
hand moving independently, enthusiastically working on the other. You have no insight, or 
awareness into the progress the other hemisphere has made. Time is nearly up, and the two 
hemispheres reunite (Parfit, 1987, p. 246-7). What are we to think of this thought experiment? 
Are two new people working on the problem? Are both of them you? In each case they will have 
the same memories as you had before and be capable of the same functioning. Survival with a 
single hemisphere is possible (Lew, 2014) and we think that the persons that have damaged an 
entire hemisphere have survived as the same person. We should feel the same way about two 
cerebral hemispheres that can operate independently of each other. We can abandon the notion of 
a normal cause and replace it with any cause. We “survive” the teletransportation, the splitting of 
a brain and the complete removal of a single hemisphere. What matters for survival isn’t a 
coherent, unified self. It is just the continuation of certain mental states and memories. 
 
26 This isn’t that fantastical as persons can survive with a single hemisphere. 
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3.4 The Competing Known Identity problem. 
 Recall the nonidentity problem. It is difficult to say how we make someone worse off, if 
all alternative interventions would result in nonexistence. Suppose what matters for identity over 
time is psychological continuity with any cause. In normal cases, we think of the benefits to 
separate persons. That is, will policy A or B result in better opportunities for the different people 
that will exist? But what if we don’t think about separate persons, but we think about a different 
policy intra-personally. This section will explore what I call the competing known identity 
problem. The problem is to figure out which version of yourself should survive when competing 
against other versions. Some preliminary remarks are in order, before I attempt to make this 
clearer. 
 The first thing to note is that a part of our identities is genetic. This was alluded to in 
section 3.2 when Parfit argued for the time dependence claim and that those born a mere 30 days 
in the future will be different persons than those born 30 days earlier. This is intuitive for those 
who have a modern understanding of genetics and heredity. How much of our identities is up to 
debate, but some evidence shows that identical twins are more alike than siblings (Funk et al, 
2013) and biological siblings are more alike than adoptive ones (Pinker, 2002, p. 65). However 
genetics cannot be the whole story as cultural influences can change who we are. Neil Levy 
views the debate not in terms of nature or nurture alone, but how much each element contributes 
to who we become (2004, p. 129). What should be clear from Parfit’s time dependence claim, 
and the fact that we see greater similarity among individuals that have greater genetic similarities 
is that some portion of our identity is biological.  
 One last thought experiment from Parfit can help elucidate what I mean. Imagine you 
have a twin and the both of you are in an accident. Your body is damaged beyond repair, while 
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your twins’ body is in perfect working order, his brain is completely destroyed. You are given a 
brain transplant and successfully wake up in your twin’s body (1987, p. 253). We could further 
imagine that only my twins’ brain was damaged in the accident. My brain is split into two, one 
hemisphere is placed in each body. “I” survive, or at least my mental states do. It seems that each 
hemisphere would feel more at home in a body that was “my own”, as opposed to being placed 
in a new and foreign body.  This is me in every relevant meaning of the term as my memories 
and genetic constitution are still intact. But why stop at two? If what matters for survival is 
psychological continuity with any cause, what would happen if we made thousands of copies of 
“myself” each waking up thinking they were the original me? What if we altered their physical 
and mental capacities all the while conserving their memories? Would some identities feel 
cheated? Would some opt to not survive? Would some prefer the survival of others? I will 
explore these questions further with the case of Sarah. But first here is some preliminary remarks 
on the natural aging process. 
 Our identities are shaped and molded as we age. We begin as infants, reach childhood, 
progress to adolescence and then sail into maturity. Many of us will have a regressive phase 
where our memories fail, and we begin to lose a grip on reality.27 We tend to privilege the views 
of some of these stages more than others. The views of adulthood are given greater weight than 
those of adolescence and given more weight than those entering senility. One possibility is that 
we could have an extra stage of development, one that surpasses adulthood and if so, should we 
privilege that stage of development more so than the other stages found naturally in life? The 
answer is yes, and this will become clear with the introduction of Sarah. 
 
27 Alzheimer’s and Dementia are prime examples. 
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 Sarah, a young woman, has agreed to have thousands of copies of herself made. She is a 
hardworking professional woman in her early thirties, she is in the prime of her life. As part of 
the replication process she is informed that each replica will have all her memories and her 
general constitution but will be altered in some way. Some replicas will be blind, deaf, or 
otherwise disabled, such as the loss of motor movements. Others will experience reductions in 
IQ, as if they had a traumatic brain injury. Others will experience boosts in performance such as 
a slightly higher IQ and greater motivational sets. Some will even be radically enhanced. They 
will more closely resemble Agar’s pod-people. We will return to radically enhanced versions of 
Sarah later in this section, for now we will focus on versions of Sarah that are modified within 
the species-typical range. Although there will be multiple versions of Sarah, these changes won’t 
be significant enough to change her into a new person. If we made any of the changes to Sarah 
absent any copies being made, we would normally think this to be the same Sarah. Some of these 
changes we routinely make. Antidepressants can alter mood and motivation, stimulants can 
improve cognition, and a myriad of accidents can contribute to disability. Some replicas at the 
lower end of the scale will not be so lucky, their alterations will approach deviations from 
normal. They may be bipolar, have PTSD, anxiety and panic attacks, or be borderline suicidal. 
The experiment is to run for one year, at which time all but two “Sarah’s” will survive, the rest 
are destined to be destroyed. This leaves room for each individual Sarah to select for her bodies 
survival, and for the selection of a second version who she thinks should survive. How will these 
competing versions of Sarah decide? I call this the problem of competing known identities. How 
do we decide who survives amongst competing versions of ourselves? Which version of 
ourselves we choose for survival will determine what persons live. The memories and 
experiences of someone with higher cognitive functions, who enjoys math will be different than 
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someone who enjoys the solitude and comfort of life on the farm.  As time passes for Sarah from 
the initial replication date, different versions will become different people. The only difference 
between the competing known identity problem and the nonidentity problem is if the policy 
interventions make changes inter, rather than intra-personally. 
 There are three logical possibilities that govern Sarah’s choice. I will refer to the original 
Sarah as Sarah¢ (Sarah prime) and the replicas as Sarah*. Sarah* can refer to a single replica, or 
an entire group of replicas. First, there could be no agreement on what constitutes a good life, 
and what Sarah should have the priority in survival. Conversely, there may be unanimous 
agreement, where each version of Sarah votes for one ideal copy to survive. Finally there may be 
mixed agreement among each competing version. I will explore each of these consequences in 
fuller detail 
 The first scenario seems unlikely. Imagine for a moment we are not talking about 
physical capacities, but rather disposition to believe. As there is some evidence that political 
views and dispositions have a genetic basis, small nonidentity altering changes could be made to 
Sarah*. Sarah¢ may be a lawyer who works tirelessly to help refugees enter the U.S. Sarah* may 
have had an alteration that makes her hostile to out group members. She may become a white 
nationalist and work to create a pure ethnostate.  Or Sarah¢ may be highly religious and over the 
course of the next year Sarah* develops into a militant atheist. These dramatic changes are 
somewhat routine, and we would never say that Sarah wouldn’t survive these changes. They 
each have what matters for Sarah’s survival, but have developed into diametrically opposed 
persons.28 The same may hold for illness. Imagine Sarah¢ is a well to do scientist who has great 
 
28 These are dramatic changes but are they really that much different than someone who 
transforms after joining a cult. We may use language to say that we want the “real Sarah” back, 
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impulse control and is constantly in high spirits. Sarah* may lack impulse control, be riddled 
with anxiety, and experience constant mood shifts. Sarah* may find herself roaming the streets, 
looking for handouts, and providing basic services to others in exchange for cash when her mood 
allows her to. She may even find herself in jail. If competing versions of Sarah are to hold 
diametrically opposing views, then there would be no agreement. But in the case where Sarah* 
has an illness or cognitive limitations that prevent her from completing her goals, she is likely to 
agree that Sarah¢ is better option for survival, than a nearby Sarah*. 
 The case of perfect agreement is equally as unlikely. There will be much variation 
amongst the competing versions of Sarah. Not all disabilities are damaging, and not all 
disabilities reduce the overall quality of life. Sarah* may have lost the use of her legs but will 
undoubtedly feel she can accomplish all the important things Sarah¢ can. Sarah* may choose 
herself and a nearby Sarah* to survive the experiment, as she views this change to have deep and 
profound meaning. It is an empirical question how Sarah* will decide, but everyday experience 
tells us that people are generally happy with their lives, despite numerous limitations. For many, 
more capable doesn’t translate to better. For this reason, unanimous agreement is unlikely. 
 The mid-range and most likely case is one with some agreement between Sarah¢ and 
Sarah*. We can begin to group Sarah* into sets. Each set will comprise individuals of similar 
ability. It is likely that many of the sets will vote for someone in the same cohort, a nearby 
Sarah*. Some will vote for cohorts above (in the case of severe mental illness), and some may 
opt to move down (maybe the pressure of life is too much, and they want to slow down). What is 
important is that Sarah* will have some reason to choose another Sarah for survival. Nearby 
 
but we would treat her as the real Sarah. If she were to collect an inheritance, or publish a book, 
it would all be done as if she was the same person—because she is. 
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Sarah*’s will have similar constitutions and have similar reasons for their selection. More distant 
Sarah*’s will likely make a separate choice but will most likely engage in a similar reasoning 
process. Next, we will include radical enhancement in our analysis. I will argue that there is an 
upward trend to select better versions of ourselves.  
 Sarah¢ is the healthy, well to do, cognitively normal adult. Previously, I assumed that 
each Sarah* had an equal input on who would survive, that is, all votes counted the same. But, 
this isn’t for any decision made in ordinary life. Children and the cognitively disabled don’t have 
the same rights and powers as cognitively normal adults. Those versions of Sarah¢ with IQ’s in 
the range of 70 will have less to say, their vote will count for less as to who is to survive. We can 
begin to think the same thing for Sarah¢ when compared to a radically enhanced version of 
herself. It would be tempting to set a threshold at the level of Sarah¢, but as we saw in chapter 2, 
threshold setting is a matter of math. In order to have an asymmetry you need a non-arbitrary 
way of setting a threshold and need to explain why subtracting from a property makes a great 
difference, while adding to makes no difference. I will repeat the same analysis in what follows, 
but this time include a radically enhanced Sarah*  
We can again think about the three positions—no, some and unanimous agreement. In the 
case of no agreement, this becomes far less plausible. While there may be many benefits to be a 
developing child, I imagine most adults wouldn’t want to spend their entire life at that stage. 
Each adult would vote for a version of herself that had made it to adulthood. Further, many 
children can’t wait for the opportunity to grow up. As adults, many of us try our hardest to 
strengthen out cognitive capacities through education. If we naturally had a fourth stage of life, 
one where our cognitive and physical capacities were greatly elevated, we would readily 
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welcome this new, more refined stage of life. Amongst ourselves, we would agree not to be in a 
more limited state (the state of Sarah¢).  
 Unanimous agreement seems just as unlikely. Some will certainly view normal adulthood 
as the final stage they need to enter as argued by Agar with his focus on moderate enhancement. 
There may be many reasons for this, one of which is fear and concerns that they will become too 
different of a person. If they know radical enhancement is likely to make them read, engage in 
civic life, and abandon some of their more basic instincts, they may eschew it, saying they prefer 
to have limited capacities. If they know they could keep their deeply held beliefs, then perhaps 
they would be more amenable to voting for another version to survive. There may even be 
disagreement between the radically enhanced and the radically enhanced. They may excel and 
pursue different fields given the varied alterations (Gray and Gorin, 2019). They will have 
preferences suited to their interests. Some contributions may be objectively better, as they 
increase overall well-being, but others may have equal importance as it is important to grow, 
flourish and explore your own interests. 
 Some agreement again seems most likely. A radically enhanced Sarah* will most likely 
wish that the surviving replica to be in the radically enhanced state, she will select a nearby 
Sarah*, in the same way any adult would select for a version of herself that was capable of 
reaching adulthood. Some mere persons will want to enter this new state (I would vote this way), 
while some will want to stay where they are at (many readers will feel this way). What is not at 
all likely is that any group member will want to see or experience a dramatic reduction in their 
capacities. For example, a normal adult who works as a CEO probably isn’t looking to reduce 
her cognitive capacities to those of someone who has difficulty staying organized, paying bills 
on time and succeeding at the simpler tasks in society, such as a fast food worker. The fast food 
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worker may very well be very happy with her life. She may accomplish the goals she sets for 
herself, and she may even feel bad for the CEO, as the CEO lives a life of stress and focuses on 
growing wealth, as opposed to more important things like raising a family. But what is unlikely 
to happen with the fast food worker is that she will select a competing version of herself that is 
far more limited in capacity, a version that needs an executor to manage her affairs. Again, how 
each Sarah* will choose is an empirical question. But we can glimpse into real observed 
behaviors. With the exceptions of addicts, most of us don’t take substances that limit our 
cognitive and physical abilities. When we do, we do so in moderation so we can excel and 
challenge ourselves to be better. Even if Sarah* chooses a nearby version of herself for survival, 
the trend will move upward. If I am right that some stages of life are more privileged than others, 
that is, their vote would count for more, than it seems that the radically enhanced Sarah*’s will 
have the weightiest votes, and most likely won’t vote for versions that are mere persons.  
 I would like to focus on one final thought before I turn to objections. As mentioned 
earlier, personal identity is not what matters for survival. What matters is psychological 
continuity over time. I think there are two components to psychological identity that should be 
treated separately. The first, memory, I have focused on at length. The second is dispositions 
towards certain mental states and beliefs. While there is much variation in these dispositions 
there is much overlap. For two distinct individuals with highly similar dispositional mental states 
they may have more in common with each other than more distant versions of Sarah¢ and Sarah*. 
This might be analogous to problems with identifying race. Two members within a racial class 
can be more genetically diverse than two members from different racial groups. If this is right, 
and the voting system I imagined in the case of Sarah has any merit towards selecting who gets 
to come into existence, then it might be the case that we can vote in ways, and for future people 
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that are distinct, but similar enough to share some sort of “identity” conserving property. If so, 
the nonidentity problem may have greater overlap than initially thought. I won’t say anymore 
beyond this, as it would take another work of this length to make a compelling case for this 
claim. I mostly hope to leave the reader with an interesting thought before I turn to objections. 
 To recapitulate, I have argued that what matters for survival over time is the continuation 
of certain mental states. We should have control over the direction of our lives. This can be best 
accomplished by actually living life as the same person, but in modified ways. We can then ask 
competing versions of ourselves about who should survive. If we allow each version of our self 
two votes, one vote for the survival of their specific body, and a second vote for the survival of a 
separate body with modified capacities, whose memories remain intact. There will either be no 
agreement, unanimous agreement, or some agreement. Some agreement is most likely, and the 
agreement will tend to favor those with the highest capacities. The harm that befalls the 
individual is in not allowing them to become who they would in fact want to be. This can be 
viewed in the same way as if any individual stopped developing in adolescence. It would be a 
travesty to not develop to your full potential. This was the competing known identity problem. A 
similar problem, the nonidentity problem, has many parallels but is forward looking in nature. 
The nonidentity problem aims to ensure future persons who are brought into existence have a life 
worth living. The competing known identity problem is backward looking. When deciding who 
lives, and who is brought into existence we defer to the best versions of ourselves. As their will 
be an upward trend to select for the most capable, and those with the greatest capacities will have 
the most weight in this decision-making process, the version of ourselves that we will select for 
will be some version with radical enhancements. The harm that will result from not enhancing 
will be to not let one become who they want to be. I have given compelling reasons to radically 
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enhance, without making any claims as to what specific enhancements would, or should, be 
selected for.  
3.5 Objections from Agar 
 Recall Agars first concern is that of transformative change and the pod-people. For each 
individual, they will have different evaluative frameworks for what constitutes the good life. On 
my view, the transformative change would be in relation to Sarah¢ and a radically enhanced 
Sarah*. Conservatives about enhancement often use examples of stunted capacities and 
motivations that are all together alien to a unique individual. The pod-people have lost most of 
what makes them human, and the joys of human life. On my view these pod-people would not be 
selected for amongst other competing versions. The pod-people are one version among many that 
could produced through various technological changes. It is hard to see how they would qualify 
as having enhancements.29 More likely scenarios of enhancement will retain much of what 
makes our lives worth living—love, joy and laughter. If, for some reason, the pod-people were 
selected to survive, this choice would be brought about by a committee of highly versions of 
ourselves. In which case a pod-persons survival would seem appropriate. In real life we won’t 
have the power to vote against different versions of ourselves, but we will have the power to vote 
for different versions of nonexistent future persons. For the time being there is no reason to 
suppose that we will enhance in the direction of pod-people. We have far greater reasons to think 
large parts of humanity will be conserved. 
 Agar’s second point was about internal goods and the anthropocentric ideal. Goods have 
intrinsic value as long as they satisfy a human curiosity. The objection is that we should pursue 
 
29 If you watch the film this will become more obvious. The pod-people are dull, uninteresting 
and murderous. 
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goods that are valuable to us and avoid goods that are intrinsically valueless. But there is no 
uniform set of intrinsic goods across the many stages of life we enter. Try explaining calculus to 
a child (or for that matter an adult), and we can find that no curiosity will be satisfied. The joys 
of calculus come with time, and for some it will be perennially outside of their reach. But this is 
no reason not to create beings who are capable of manipulating math. We share what we can 
with those that have learning difficulties, and the insights we have can make their lives more 
interesting and inspired. Having adults with greater cognitive capacities is a pleasant thing for us, 
and it should be just as pleasant as the gap grows between mere and post-persons. 
 Third, Agar argues the natural stages of growing up are different than enhancement. In 
the normal course of events we grow through effortful and demanding training. Our 
achievements stand in a special relationship to us, they come from within. The achievements 
from enhancement come from outside and skip much of the effort that was required of natural 
humans. This is bad in that we lose a sense of ourselves. I think two things can be said about this. 
First, take any math class and it will be clear that some need to work far harder than others to 
understand the most basic of concepts, let alone mathematics at the highest level. The difference 
between any two individuals could be marked and we have little reason to think that one 
experience is more valuable than the other. The natural lottery of life largely determines how 
much we need to struggle with any task. Second, the enhanced may breeze through milestones 
we as mere persons struggle to achieve, but they will have their own milestones to tackle and 
surpass. One thing we have learned is that the more we discover, the less we know. The 
enhanced will feel the same way. They will have better access and capabilities to manipulate and 
store information, but they will have much more to learn and explore. They will have just as 
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meaningful lives and will have to exert effort, and make sacrifice, they will just do it at a higher 
level. 
 Fourth, Agar argues that we can secure external goods (better health care) through other 
means than enhancement. This may be true in the near future, but using multiple means to pursue 
the same goods seems a better strategy than pursing any one alone. If we think about progress in 
aggregate, enhancement will be another method that can compound the benefits from external 
technologies. When taken as a whole, the sum of progress will be far greater over time if we 
include enhancement. When we are talking about improving the quality of billions of lives, we 
need every advantage we can get, and that may include creating workers who have greater drive 
and capacities to solve problems.  
 The final point is that humans cannot survive the enhancement process. We will tend to 
give up on our autobiographical memories and hence not survive. I am weary of this claim. First, 
we could readily imagine we enhance so as to preserve memory. This may make it impossible 
for us to not survive. But imagine we do lose all our memories of our former self and become a 
new person, is that really so bad? Is that any worse than ordinary death? It seems not, and the 
benefit is that this form of death will take place over time, instead of a single instant. For the new 
you that survives, it will have felt like a seamless transition, an experience not to fear but 
welcome. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 This work has argued for the many benefits of enhancement. If we abandon outdated 
concepts like dignity, we can begin to focus on what truly matters, that is, moral status. Post-
persons will experience a reduction in moral status and will be better equipped to address the 
needs of mere persons, than mere persons themselves. Even though the enhanced don’t yet exist, 
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we have reasons to push for their creation. If we give up on the notion of a central “I” we can 
focus on what matters for survival, the continuation of certain psychological states. We can 
survive the process of radical enhancement. If we take a backward-looking view, we will most 
likely find the radically enhanced will want to exist with heightened capacities. Less capable 
counterparts will most likely agree. All this suggests that we have reason to enhance and to do so 
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